Agent & LLM security, tested how it's attacked.
Prompt injection, tool abuse, RAG poisoning, MCP trust, guardrail bypass.
LLM applications
AI agents & tool calling
RAG & knowledge
MCP & integrations
Real findings. Real fixes. Verified closed.
Guardrail that cannot be overridden
B2B CRM · outbound agent
A send-cap could be raised via config to bypass a hold — risking domain blacklisting.
Dispatcher enforces min(cap, guardrailCap); a five-signal risk score holds sends. Closed.
Upload & access hardening
Revenue-integrity platform
Stored XSS via upload, a hardcoded default credential, and an open redirect.
Upload sanitisation, forced rotation, redirect allow-list. Closed.
SSRF & webhook trust
Outbound webhooks & mail hosts
Webhooks and mail hosts could point at internal addresses; signatures were bypassable.
DNS-resolved SSRF guard + signature verification. Closed.
closed & verified, not a report
deep AI/LLM/MCP expertise
we run it in production first
founder-led, AI-accelerated
Shipping agents? Let's pressure-test them.
Authorised scope, signed first. Then we run the agent attack playbook and close what we find.
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